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IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT
Working Group II Table Of Contents Each chapter listed in this Table of Contents is linked to a brief summary of that chapter. The chapter summaries rely mainly on language from the Working Group II Summary for Policymakers. For an official summary of the report, the Working Group II Summary for Policymakers and Technical Summary: is available on the IPCC Secretariat website. Introductory Materials: Primers
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Models project that a sustained increase of 1 degree C in global mean temperature is sufficient to cause changes in regional climates that will affect the growth and regeneration capacity of forests in many regions. In several instances, this will alter the function and composition of forests significantly. As a consequence of possible changes in temperature and water availability under doubled equivalent-carbon dioxide equilibrium conditions, a substantial fraction (a global average of one-third, varying by region from one-seventh to two-thirds) of the existing forested area of the world will undergo major changes in broad vegetation types-with the greatest changes occurring in high latitudes and the least in the tropics. Climate change is expected to occur at a rapid rate relative to the speed at which forest species can grow, reproduce, and reestablish themselves at new locations. Although net primary productivity could increase, the standing biomass of forests may not because of more frequent outbreaks and extended ranges of pests and pathogens, and increasing frequency and intensity of fires. Large amounts of carbon could be released into the atmosphere during transitions from one forest type to another because the rate at which carbon can be lost during times of high forest mortality is greater than the rate at which it can be gained through growth to maturity.
Climate change is likely to have its most significant impact on boreal forests through loss of the southern boreal forests, slow invasion of northern treelines into tundra areas, increased fire frequency, and pest outbreaks. The potential area for temperate forests is projected to change the least, but some existing forests, especially in dry regions, will undergo significant changes in species composition. Tropical forests are likely to be more affected by changes in land use than by climate change as long as deforestation continues at its current rate; the greatest effect of climate change on tropical forests is likely to result from changes in soil water availability.
Boundaries between rangelands and other ecosystems appear likely to change as a result of direct climate effects on species composition, as well as indirect factors such as changes in wildfire frequency and land use. Temperate rangelands will experience these effects the most. Migration rates of rangeland vegetation appear to be faster than for forests. The amounts and seasonal distribution of precipitation are the primary controls on rangeland carbon cycling and productivity. Water availability and balance play vital roles in controlling the productivity and geographic distribution of rangeland ecosystems; thus, small changes in precipitation and in extreme temperatures may have disproportionate effects. Devising adaptation strategies for rangeland systems may prove difficult in marginal food-producing areas where production is very sensitive to climate change, changing of technology is risky, and the rate of adoption of new techniques and practices is slow. Decreases in rangeland productivity would likely result in a decline in the overall contribution of the livestock industries to national economies, especially in many developing areas with pastoral economies. Adaptation options in more highly managed pastures include management of forage, animal breeding, and irrigation. Mitigation options to increase carbon sequestration and reduce methane emissions focus on improving vegetation and soil conditions and improving animal management practices.
Desertification, as defined by the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, is land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas, resulting from various factors, particularly human activities and climatic variations. Overstocking, overcultivation, and wood collection can strip the land of its cover, leaving it more vulnerable to climatic events. Droughts may trigger or accelerate desertification by reducing the growth of important plant species. The amount of precipitation needed to sustain growth varies with the temperature, soil moisture capacity, and species. Adaptation to drought and desertification may rely on the development of diversified production systems, such as agroforestry techniques and ranching of animals better adapted to local conditions. However, adaptation also needs political, social, extension service, and educational inputs.
In most mountain regions, a warmer climate will reduce the extent and volume of glaciers and the amount of permafrost and seasonal snow cover. Along with possible precipitation changes, this would affect soil stability and a range of socioeconomic activities (e.g., agriculture, tourism, hydropower, and logging). Climate change may disrupt mountain resources for indigenous populations (e.g., fuel and subsistence and cash crops) in many developing countries. Recreational activities, which are increasingly important economically to many regions, also face likely disruptions. Perturbations to water regimes in mountains would have major consequences for people living downstream, outside of the mountains, who are heavily dependent on their hydrological resources.
Because of their climatic and habitat diversity, mountains provide excellent locations for maintaining biological diversity. In particular, large north-south mountain chains can facilitate migration if appropriately managed, and anticipating for climate change.
Climate change will most greatly influence the distribution and functions of wetlands by altering their hydrologic regimes (e.g., increasing or decreasing water availability; changing the depth, duration, frequency, and season of flooding). These changes will alter the value of wetlands to societies for such functions as aquifer recharge, sediment retention, waste processing, and carbon storage. For example, some Arctic areas have already shifted from weak carbon sinks to weak carbon sources due to drying. However, due to the heterogeneity of non-tidal wetlands, and because their hydrologic conditions vary greatly within and among different wetland types and sites, the impact of climate change on these ecosystems will be site-specific, and cannot be generalized in terms of locations or wetland categories. While there are possibilities for adaptation, restoration, and creation of local-scale wetland functions (e.g., habitat value, pollution trapping, and to some degree flood control), for the regional and global functions (e.g., carbon storage and trace gas fluxes), there are no human responses that can be applied at the necessary scale.
Projected changes in climate will substantially reduce the extent and volume of the cryosphere over the next century, causing pronounced reductions in mountain glaciers, permafrost, and seasonal snow cover. By the year 2100, between one-third and one-half of existing mountain glacier mass could disappear. Changes in the cryosphere are projected to have multiple effects on other systems. The reduced extent of glaciers and depth of snow cover would affect the seasonal distribution of river flow and water supply for hydroelectric generation and agriculture; increased glacial runoff would enhance water resources in some areas, while other areas would experience water shortages as glaciers disappear. Anticipated hydrological changes and reductions in the areal extent and depth of permafrost could lead to large-scale damage to infrastructure, an additional flux of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and changes in processes that contribute to the flux of methane into the atmosphere. Thawing permafrost in the tundra could also disrupt petroleum production and distribution systems. There would be striking changes in the landscapes of many high mountains; reduced snow cover and glaciers would restrict alpine skiing and winter tourism.
On the positive side, reduced sea-ice extent and thickness would increase the seasonal duration of navigation on rivers and in coastal areas that are presently affected by seasonal ice cover and could increase navigability in the Arctic Ocean. Little change in the overall extent of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets is expected over the next 50-100 years.
Oceans are sensitive to changes in temperature, freshwater inputs from continents and atmospheric circulation, and the interaction of these factors with other environmental factors such as UV-B radiation and pollution (which is especially important in inland seas, bays, and other coastal areas). Climate change may alter sea level, increasing it on average, and also could lead to altered ocean circulation, vertical mixing, wave climate, and reductions in sea-ice cover. As a result, nutrient availability, biological productivity, the structure and functions of marine ecosystems, the ocean's heat- and carbon-storage capacity, and important feedbacks to the climate system would change as well. Paleoclimatic data and model experiments suggest that abrupt climatic changes can occur if freshwater influx from the movement and melting of sea ice or ice sheets significantly weakens global thermohaline circulation (the sinking of dense surface waters in polar seas that moves bottom water toward the equator).
The most pervasive effects on human uses of the oceans would be due to impacts on biotic resources. Some anticipated adverse effects to humans are increased coral bleaching; the need for expanded dredging operations to maintain Northern Hemisphere ports; possible reductions in commercial fish yields; and possible increases in tropical storms and hurricanes. A potential benefit to human populations is the introduction of routine shipping into the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route of Russia. The limited possibilities for adapting to the impacts of climate change on oceans include reducing land-based pollution and improving design standards for off-shore oil rigs to mitigate the effects of tropical storms.
Coastal systems are ecologically and economically important and are expected to vary widely in their response to changes in climate and sea level. Climate change and a rise in sea level or changes in storms or storm surges could result in the displacement of wetlands and lowlands, erosion of shores and associated habitat, increased salinity of estuaries and freshwater aquifers, altered tidal ranges in rivers and bays, changes in sediment and nutrient transport, a change in the pattern of chemical and microbiological contamination in coastal areas, and increased coastal flooding. In many areas, intensive human alteration and use of coastal environments already have reduced the capacity of natural systems to respond dynamically. Other regions, however, may prove far less sensitive and may keep pace with climate and sea-level change.
Some coastal ecosystems face heightened risks from changes in climate and sea level. A number of regional studies show the disappearance of saltwater marshes, mangrove ecosystems, and coastal wetlands at a rate of 0.5-1.5% per year over the last few decades, mainly as a result of human development. The interaction of climate change, sea-level rise, and human development would further threaten these particularly sensitive ecosystems. For example, the sea level may rise faster than sediment accretion rates in many coastal areas; thus, existing wetlands will disappear faster than new ones appear. Ecosystems on coral atolls and in river deltas show special sensitivity to climate and sea-level change. Changes in these ecosystems almost certainly will have major negative effects on tourism, freshwater supplies, fisheries, and biodiversity. Such impacts would further modify the functioning of coastal oceans and inland waters already stressed by human activities.
Coral reefs are the most biologically diverse marine ecosystems; they also are very sensitive to temperature changes. Short-term increases in water temperatures on the order of only 1 to 2 degrees C can cause "bleaching," leading to reef destruction. Sustained increases of 3 to 4 degrees C above long-term average seasonal maxima over a 6-month period can cause significant coral mortality. Biologists suggest that fully restoring these coral communities could require several centuries. A rising sea level also could harm coral reefs. Although available studies indicate that even slow-growing corals can keep pace with the "central estimate" of sea-level rise (approximately 0.5 cm per year), these studies do not take account of other pressures on coral populations, such as pollution or enhanced sedimentation.
Climate change clearly will increase the vulnerability of some coastal populations to flooding and erosional land loss. Estimates put about 46 million people per year currently at risk of flooding due to storm surges. This estimate results from multiplying the total number of people currently living in areas potentially affected by ocean flooding by the probability of flooding at these locations in any year, given the present protection levels and population density. In the absence of adaptation measures, a 50-cm sea-level rise would increase this number to about 92 million; a 1-meter sea-level rise would raise it to 118 million. If one incorporates anticipated population growth, the estimates increase substantially. Some small island nations and other countries will confront greater vulnerability because their existing sea and coastal defense systems are less well-established. Countries with higher population densities would be more vulnerable. For these countries, sea-level rise could force internal or international migration of populations.
A number of studies have evaluated sensitivity to a 1-meter sea-level rise. This increase is at the top of the range of IPCC Working Group I estimates for 2100; it should be noted, however, that sea level is actually projected to continue to rise in future centuries beyond 2100. Studies using this 1-meter projection show a particular risk for small islands and deltas. Estimated land losses range from 0.05% in Uruguay, 1.0% for Egypt, 6% for the Netherlands, and 17.5% for Bangladesh to about 80% for the Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands, given the present state of protection systems. Large numbers of people are also affected-for example, about 70 million each in China and Bangladesh. Many nations face lost capital value in excess of 10% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although annual protection costs for many nations are relatively modest (about 0.1% of GDP), the average annual costs to many small island states total several percent of GDP. For some island nations, the high cost of providing storm-surge protection would make it essentially infeasible, especially given the limited availability of capital for investment.
Freshwater aquatic ecosystems encompass lakes, streams, and non-tidal wetlands. These systems are sensitive to changes in temperature, precipitation, and water level and in turn exert important feedbacks on climate by influencing carbon fluxes. They provide a range of socioeconomic values and benefits-including food, energy, transportation, timber, flood mitigation, erosion control, water supply, and recreation.
Inland aquatic ecosystems will be influenced by climate change through altered water temperatures, flow regimes, and water levels. These will directly affect the survival, reproduction, and growth of organisms; the productivity of ecosystems; the persistence and diversity of species; and the regional distribution of biota. Climatic warming would tend to shift geographic ranges of many species poleward. In lakes and streams, warming would have the greatest biological effects at high latitudes, where biological productivity would increase, and at the low-latitude boundaries of cold- and coolwater species ranges, where extinctions would be greatest. Warming of larger and deeper temperate zone lakes would increase their productivity, although in some shallow lakes and in streams warming could increase the likelihood of anoxic conditions. Deep tropical lakes may become less productive as thermal stratification intensifies and nutrients become trapped below the mixed layer.
Changes in hydrologic variability are expected to have greater ecological effects than changes in mean values. Increases in flow variability, particularly the frequency and duration of large floods and droughts, would tend to reduce water quality and biological productivity and habitat in streams. Water-level declines will be most severe in lakes and streams in dry evaporative drainages and in basins with small catchments. For many lakes and streams, the most severe effects of climate change may be the exacerbation of current stresses resulting from human activities, including increasing demands for consumptive uses, increasing waste effluent loadings, and runoff of agricultural and urban pollutants.
Climate change would have direct impacts on economic activity in the industry, energy, and transportation sectors; impacts on markets for goods and services; and impacts on the natural resources on which economic activity depends. The subsectors and activities most sensitive to climate change include agroindustry, energy demand, production of renewable energy such as hydroelectricity and biomass, construction, some transportation activities, existing flood mitigation structures, and transportation infrastructure located in many areas, including vulnerable coastal zones and permafrost regions. In the energy sector, the consequences for hydroelectric power generation would depend upon changes in the balance between the amount and timing of precipitation and evaporation. Increased scarcity of fuelwood in dry and densely populated regions could exacerbate problems caused by deforestation. Winter demand for primary energy would decrease due to a reduction in space-heating needs; summer demand for electricity is likely to increase with greater cooling requirements in some regions. Total energy demand would fall in regions in the higher latitudes but could rise in warmer regions. For some countries with temperate climates, different studies come to different conclusions.
In contrast to research on mitigation options, relatively few studies exist on climate change impacts on and adaptation options for the industry, energy, and transportation sectors. This situation reflects a perception of low vulnerability to climate change for these sectors. Even fewer studies refer to impacts on developing countries.
Many adaptive mechanisms are available to address each of the potential direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human settlements. The cost and effectiveness of each depend on local circumstances. Effective coastal-zone management and land-use regulation can help direct population shifts away from vulnerable locations such as flood plains, steep hillsides, and low-lying coastlines. Programs of disaster assistance can offset some of the more serious negative consequences of climate change and reduce the number of ecological refugees. Many of the most vulnerable human settlements, however, are located in damage-prone areas of the developing world that do not have the resources to cope with impacts.
Focusing on global agricultural production does not address the potentially serious consequences of large differences at local and regional scales, even at midlatitudes. There may be increased risk of hunger and famine in some locations; many of the world's poorest people-particularly those living in subtropical and tropical areas and dependent on isolated agricultural systems in semi-arid and arid regions-are most at risk of increased hunger. Many of these at-risk populations are found in sub-Saharan Africa; South, East, and Southeast Asia; and tropical areas of Latin America, as well as some Pacific island nations.
Adaptation-such as changes in crops and crop varieties, improved water-management and irrigation systems, and changes in planting schedules and tillage practices-will be important in limiting negative effects and taking advantage of beneficial changes in climate. The extent of adaptation depends on the affordability of such measures, particularly in developing countries; access to know-how and technology; the rate of climate change; and biophysical constraints such as water availability, soil characteristics, and crop genetics. The incremental costs of adaptation strategies could create a serious burden for some developing countries; some adaptation strategies may result in cost savings for some countries. There are significant uncertainties about the capacity of different regimes to adapt successfully to projected climate change.
The quantity and quality of water supplies already are serious problems today in many regions, including some low-lying coastal areas, deltas, and small islands, making countries in these regions particularly vulnerable to any additional reduction in indigenous water supplies. Water availability currently falls below 1,000 m3 per person per year-a common benchmark for water scarcity-in a number of countries (e.g., Kuwait, Jordan, Israel, Rwanda, Somalia, Algeria, Kenya) or is expected to fall below this benchmark in the next two to three decades (e.g., Libya, Egypt, South Africa, Iran, Ethiopia). In addition, a number of countries in conflict-prone areas are highly dependent on water originating outside their borders (e.g., Cambodia, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq).
The impacts of climate change will depend on the baseline condition of the water supply system and the ability of water resource managers to respond not only to climate change but also to population growth and changes in demands, technology, and economic, social, and legislative conditions. In some cases-particularly in wealthier countries with integrated water-management systems-improved management may protect water users from climate change at minimal cost; in many others, however, there could be substantial economic, social, and environmental costs, particularly in regions that already are water-limited and where there is a considerable competition among users. Experts disagree over whether water supply systems will evolve substantially enough in the future to compensate for the anticipated negative impacts of climate change on water resources and for potential increases in demand.
Options for dealing with the possible impacts of a changed climate and increased uncertainty about future supply and demand for freshwater include more efficient management of existing supplies and infrastructure; institutional arrangements to limit future demands/promote conservation; improved monitoring and forecasting systems for floods/droughts; rehabilitation of watersheds, especially in the tropics; and construction of new reservoir capacity to capture and store excess flows produced by altered patterns of snowmelt and storms.
Options for ameliorating and adapting to the potential global timber shortages include reducing social pressures driving land conversion and developing tree plantations in the tropics; using modern forestry practices and substituting non-timber products in temperate regions; and rapid reforestation with warmth-adapted seeds in boreal regions.
The insurance industry currently is under stress from a series of "Billion Dollar" storms since 1987, resulting in dramatic increases in claims, reduced availability of insurance, and higher premiums. These higher losses reflect significant increases in infrastructure and economic worth, as well as a possible shift in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. (Parallel trends in drought and flood losses have often not been insured, placing the burden directly on other sectors.)
The implications of climate change for financial services other than property insurance are less clear. Changes in human health may affect the life insurance and pension industries. Banking may be vulnerable to repercussions from property damage. The economies of selected regions, such as coastal areas, may be disadvantaged. Returns on investment may be affected by changes in the economics of energy-consuming industries.
The insurance sector can help authorities improve the response to property damage from extreme events through providing information on the cost of weather hazards, advice on vulnerable construction design, and disaster-recovery services. However, the insurance industry is not likely to be able to provide all the necessary funds for the post-disaster reconstruction.
Indirect effects of climate change include increases in the potential transmission of vector-borne infectious diseases (e.g., malaria, dengue, yellow fever, and some viral encephalitis) resulting from extensions of the geographical range and season for vector organisms. This could lead to potential increases in malaria incidence, primarily in tropical, subtropical, and less well-protected temperate-zone populations. Some increases in non-vector-borne infectious diseases-such as salmonellosis, cholera, and giardiasis-also could occur, particularly in tropical and subtropical regions, as a result of elevated temperatures and increased flooding. Additional indirect effects include increases in respiratory and allergic disorders due to climate-enhanced increases in some air pollutants, pollens and mold spores. Exposure to air pollution and stressful weather events combine to increase the likelihood of morbidity and mortality. Some regions could experience a decline in nutritional status as a result of adverse impacts on food and fisheries productivity. A range of adverse public health effects would result from physical and demographic disruptions due to sea-level rise. Other potentially adverse health effects could be associated with water shortages, conflicts over environmental resources, and the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer.
These and other impacts of climate change would affect different populations differently. Quantifying the projected impacts is difficult because the extent of climate-induced health disorders depends on numerous coexistent and interacting factors that characterize the vulnerability of the particular population, including environmental and socioeconomic circumstances, nutritional and immune status, population density, and access to quality health care services. Most vulnerable are populations characterized by overcrowding, food insecurity, local environmental degradation, and perturbed ecosystems, generally in developing countries.
Various technological, organizational, and behavioral adaptations would lessen these adverse effects. Adaptive options include improved and extended medical care services; environmental management; disaster preparedness; public education; and the pre-assessment of risks from proposed technological innovations. There is also need for international monitoring of health-risk indicators in relation to climate change. However, the tropical and subtropical countries at highest risk from many of these impacts may still lack adequate resources for adaptation.
In the energy supply sector, the authors have a high degree of confidence that GHG emissions reductions can be achieved through more efficient conversion of fossil fuels; switching to low-carbon fossil fuels and suppressing emissions; decarbonization of fuels and flue gases, and carbon dioxide (CO2) storage; increasing the use of nuclear energy; and increasing the use of renewable sources of energy.
Since the preparation of the IPCC 1990 Assessment Report, there have been some significant advances in the understanding of modern technology and technological innovations relating to energy systems that can reduce GHG emissions. Examples of such technologies are found, inter alia, in gas turbine technology; coal and biomass gasification technology; production of transportation fuels from biomass; wind energy utilization; electricity generation with photovoltaic and solar thermal electric technologies; approaches to handling intermittent generation of electricity; fuel cells for transportation and power generation; nuclear energy; CO2 sequestering; and hydrogen as a major new energy carrier, produced first from natural gas and later from biomass, coal, and electrolysis.
In addition to climate change concerns, the energy supply options discussed here (with the exception of carbon sequestering) could address local and regional environmental problems, generate rural income and employment, and promote land restoration and preservation.
A wide range of modular renewable and other emission-reducing technologies are good candidates for cost-cutting through innovation and experience. For such technologies, the cost of the needed research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) and commercialization support is relatively modest. The availability, cost, and penetration of technology options will strongly depend on government action. While some technology options would penetrate the current marketplace, to realize other options, governments would have to take integrated action-by improving market efficiency, by finding new ways to internalize external costs, by accelerating RD&D on low- and zero-CO2 emitting technologies, and by providing temporary incentives for early market development for these technologies.
To assess the potential impact of combinations of individual measures at the energy system level, in contrast to the level of individual technologies, "thought experiments" exploring possible energy systems are described. These low CO2-emitting energy supply systems (LESS) were constructed to meet energy demand in (i) a low energy demand variant, developed for the IPCC's First Assessment Report (1990), where global primary commercial energy use approximately doubles, with no net change for industrialized countries but a 4.4-fold increase for developing countries from 1990 to 2100; and (ii) a higher energy demand variant, based on the IPCC IS92a scenario where energy demand quadruples from 1990 to 2100.
The analysis of these variants leads to the conclusions that deep reductions of CO2 emissions from energy supply systems are technically possible within 50 to 100 years. Many combinations of the options identified in this assessment could reduce global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels from about 6 Gt C in 1990 to about 4 Gt C per year by 2050, and to about 2 Gt C per year by 2100. Cumulative CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2100 would range from about 450 to about 470 Gt C in the alternative LESS constructions. Improvements in energy efficiency are important for achieving deep reductions in CO2 emissions, for increasing the flexibility of supply-side combinations, and for reducing overall energy system costs. Trade in energy grows in the LESS constructions compared to today's levels, expanding sustainable development options for Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East during the next century.
Costs for energy services in these "thought experiments" relative to costs for conventional energy depend on relative future energy prices, which are uncertain within a wide range, and on the performance and cost characteristics assumed for alternative technologies. However, within the wide range of future energy prices, one or more of the variants would plausibly be capable of providing the demanded energy services at estimated costs that are approximately the same as estimated future costs for current conventional energy. It is not possible to identify a least-cost future energy system for the longer term, as the relative costs of options depend on resource constraints and technological opportunities that are imperfectly known, and on actions by governments and the private sector. The literature provides strong support for the feasibility of achieving the performance and cost characteristics assumed for energy technologies in the LESS constructions within the next two decades. However, these performance and cost characteristics cannot be achieved without a strong and sustained investment in R,D&D. Market penetration and continued acceptability of different energy technologies ultimately depends on their relative cost, performance (including environmental performance), institutional arrangements, and regulations and policies. Because of the large number of options, there is flexibility as to how the energy supply system could evolve, and paths of energy system development could be influenced by considerations other than climate change, including political, environmental, and socioeconomic circumstances.
Numerous studies have indicated that 10-30% energy efficiency gains above present levels are feasible at little or no net cost in many parts of the world through technical conservation measures and improved management practices over the next 2 to 3 decades. Using technologies that presently yield the highest output of energy services for a given input of energy, efficiency gains of 50-60% would be technically feasible in many countries over the same time period. The potential for greenhouse gas emissions reductions exceeds the potential for energy use efficiency because of the possibility of switching fuels and energy sources.
Improving energy efficiency, reducing the material content of products, and using fuels with a lower carbon content are essential activities for industrialized countries. Shifting to more advanced technologies will also place developing countries and those with economies in transition on a lower greenhouse gas development trajectory. Implementing more energy-efficient industrial technologies will depend on many factors. Chief among them are future cost reductions, financing, and technology transfer, as well as measures to overcome a variety of non-technical barriers.
Energy use in 1990 was estimated to be 61-65 EJ, and is projected to grow to 90-140 EJ in 2025 without new measures. Projected energy use in 2025 could be reduced by about a third to 60-100 EJ through vehicles using very efficient drive-trains, light-weight construction and low-air-resistance design, without compromising comfort and performance. Further energy-use reductions are possible through the use of smaller vehicles; altered land-use patterns, transport systems, mobility patterns and lifestyles; and shifting to less energy-intensive transport modes. Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy used could be reduced through the use of alternative fuels and electricity from renewable sources. These measures, taken together, provide the opportunity for reducing global transport energy-related greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 40% of projected emissions by 2025. Actions to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions from transport can simultaneously address other problems such as local air pollution.
Realizing these opportunities seems unlikely, however, without new policies and measures in many countries. Developing cheap, lightweight, recyclable materials and advanced propulsion and vehicle-control systems will require continued research. Policies that affect traffic volume also play an important role. These include road tolls, restriction of car access and parking in town centers, and the provision of infrastructure for nonmotorized transport in town centers. Several cities in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Europe have succeeded in stemming growth in car use by employing combined strategies. Success in reducing carbon emissions will require integrated approaches and probably will depend on simultaneously addressing other problems such as congestion and air pollution.
Improvements in energy efficiency will be possible for many years in industrialized nations, and the developing world has even greater opportunities to improve energy efficiency if the appropriate resources are made available. Effective implementation requires well-designed combinations of financial incentives and other government policies, including energy pricing strategies, regulatory programs, utility demand-side management programs, and R&D. Strategies to reduce emissions likely will prove more effective if they use well-integrated mixes of policies, tailored for local situations and developed through consultation with and participation by those most affected.
Methane emissions from agriculture can be decreased significantly by improved nutrition of ruminant animals and better management of rice paddies (e.g., irrigation, nutrients, new cultivars). Altering the treatment and management of animal wastes and reducing agricultural biomass burning also will decrease methane releases. Nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizers, animal wastes, and legume cropping could be reduced by improving agricultural management. Finally, fossil fuel use for agriculture in industrialized countries could be reduced through the use of such practices as minimum tillage and irrigation scheduling. Proposed options for conserving and sequestering carbon and reducing other greenhouse gas emissions in the agriculture sector are consistent with sustainable development, protection of other natural resources (e.g., biodiversity, soil, water), and increasing agricultural productivity.
In the forestry sector, assuming the present climate and no change in the estimated area of available lands, the cumulative amount of carbon that could feasibly be conserved and sequestered through establishment of plantations and agro-forestry, sustaining existing forest cover, forest regeneration, and slowing deforestation over the period 1995-2050 ranges between 60 and 90 GtC. The literature indicates that the tropics have the potential to conserve and sequester the largest quantity of carbon (80% of the global total in the forestry sector), while the temperate and boreal zones could sequester about 20% of the global total. Altering climate and land-use assumptions would reduce these estimates significantly.
The full costs of conserving or sequestering carbon in forests are difficult to generalize given the amenity value of forests, their importance in traditional economies, and their significance in maintaining regional environments and biodiversity; these costs, however, can be competitive with other mitigation options. Factors affecting costs include opportunity costs of land; initial costs of planting and establishment; costs of nurseries; the cost of annual maintenance and monitoring; and transaction costs. These costs generally increase from low- to high-latitude nations and most likely from methods of slowing deforestation to establishing plantations. Direct and indirect benefits will vary with national circumstances and could offset the costs.
The types of methods covered in the guidelines include macroeconomic models; decision analysis tools; forecasting methods; costing models; market research methods; and monitoring and evaluation methods. In addition to descriptions of methods, the guidelines describe several broader aspects of the mitigation options assessment process, including the strategic, analytical and informational challenges; organizational issues; and important cross-cutting issues such as top-down versus bottom-up modeling, accounting for uncertainty, and incorporating externalities.
While the guidelines place a special emphasis on the needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition, the methods and models addressed are intended to match a range of analytical capabilities and resource constraints. Research in the preparation of these guidelines has demonstrated that methods to assess mitigation options are available to all countries to use in developing strategies and evaluating programs that support national economic, social, and institutional development goals; and that can slow the growth rate of greenhouse gas emissions. Although they involve analytical challenges, these methods have been widely applied in both industrialized and developing countries. The Global Environment Facility, other international organizations, and bilateral programs also provide resources to assist developing countries and those with economies in transition in obtaining information on, testing, and using these methods. The IPCC recommends that all countries evaluate and use, as appropriate, these draft methods in preparing country studies and their national communications. In the future, development and application of mitigation assessment methods will result in further improvements in the methods and the capabilities of countries to assess mitigation options. The IPCC, in coordination with other multilateral institutions, could accelerate the dissemination of selected information on assessment methods through seminars, workshops and educational materials.
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