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Land-Use and Land-Cover Change

Local Processes, Global Impacts

With 44 Figures

 Springer

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In the order of individual chapters as they appear in the book, we want to convey acknowledgments that were brought to our awareness by individual book chapter lead authors. Given his long-standing involvement in the creation and development of LUCC as a project, the introductory chapter has benefited greatly from comments by B. L. Turner II, Clark University, USA. Numerous comments on earlier versions of Chap. 4 have helped sharpening the key messages on the manifold impacts of land-use/cover change; these have been comments by Katherine Home-wood, University College London, UK, Kjeld Rasmussen, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Jürgen Merz, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Nepal, and Caroline Michellier and Sophie Vanwambeke, University of Louvain, Belgium. In Chap. 6, the Sect. 6.5 (main findings of scenarios) and 6.6 (towards better land scenarios) are based on discussions held at an IHDP/IGBP-sponsored workshop in Hofgeismar, Germany, titled “What have we learned from scenarios of land use and land cover?” in 2004. Each of the authors of Chap. 7 on linking science and policy brought years of experience working with colleagues and field teams on this subject, and wish to thank these fine teams for sharpening their thinking.

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Chapter 8 Searching for the Future of Land: Scenarios from the Local to Global Scale

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8.1 Introduction

Much of the scientific research concerned with land use and land cover issues is motivated by questions related to global environmental change. For example, will deforestation continue, and if yes, where, and at what rate? How will demographic changes affect future land use and cover? How will economic growth influence future land use and cover? What will be the magnitude of emissions of greenhouse gases related to land use and land cover? A common characteristic of these and other issues related to global environmental change is that they stimulate questions not only about past and present changes in land use and cover but also about their *future* changes. The main objective of this chapter is to summarize the state of understanding about the future of land. What are the range and predominant views of this future? What are the views on the global, continental, regional and local levels? We review what (we think) we know and don't know about the future of land by reviewing published scenarios from the global to local scale. Our aim is to identify the main messages of these scenarios especially relevant to global change issues, and to recommend how scenarios can be improved to better address the outstanding questions about global change and land use/cover.

In the first section of the chapter we describe how scenario analysis is used as a convenient tool to envision the future of land use and cover. In the next we describe the main messages of large scale scenarios and their insights into plausible global and continental-scale trends. We then review regional and local scenarios and discuss in particular current efforts to link these scenarios with the goals of different actors influencing local land use change. Finally, we identify the shortcomings of current scenarios and how they might be improved.

8.2 Scenario Analysis: A Method for Anticipating the Future of Land

Although research on the future of land is clearly needed, the scientific community has been hesitant to take up this challenge – an understandable situation considering that the projection of land use/cover requires assumptions about future global vegetation (including future areas of cropland, forest and grassland) as well anticipating society's countless decisions on where to settle, where to build, where to grow its crops, and what lands to protect. Some researchers have found a partial solution to this challenge by developing *scenarios* of future land use and cover. Scenarios are plausible views of the future based on *if, then* assertions – *If* the specified conditions are met, *then* future land use and land cover will be realized in a particular way. Scenario analysis is the procedure by which scenarios are developed, compared, and evaluated. Scenario analysis does not eliminate the uncertainties about the future, but it does provide a means to represent current knowledge in the form of consistent, conditional statements about the future.

8.2.1 Qualitative Scenarios

There are a variety of ways of classifying land scenarios. One way is to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative scenarios. Qualitative scenarios describe possible futures in the form of words rather than numbers. They can take the form of images, diagrams, phrases, or

1 outlines, but more commonly they are made up of narrative texts, called “storylines”.
2 Qualitative scenarios have the advantage of being able to represent the views of several
3 different stakeholders and experts at the same time. Another advantage is that well-written
4 storylines can be an understandable and interesting way of communicating information about
5 the future, at least as compared to dry tables of numbers or confusing graphs. A drawback is
6 that by definition they do not satisfy a need for numerical information. For example,
7 numerical estimates are needed of the future extent and type of forest land in order to compute
8 the flux of carbon dioxide between the biosphere and atmosphere.

9
10 It is common now to develop qualitative scenarios through a “participatory approach”
11 meaning a set of procedures through which experts and stakeholders work together to develop
12 the scenarios. “Experts” are individuals with expertise relevant to the scenario exercise and
13 “stakeholders” are individuals or organizations with a special interest in the outcomes of the
14 scenarios. Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish between experts and stakeholders.
15 While there is a variety of different participatory approaches, they typically include a scenario
16 panel made up of stakeholders and experts that develop the basic ideas of the qualitative
17 scenarios at a series of intensive meetings. Between meetings a secretariat prepares input to
18 the scenarios and elaborates storylines. The “SAS” (Story and Simulation) procedure is a
19 participatory approach used to develop both qualitative and quantitative scenarios (Alcamo,
20 2001). Here storylines are outlined and refined at scenario panel meetings and between
21 meetings a secretariat works with modeling teams to quantify the scenarios. A key feature of
22 this approach is that the qualitative and quantitative scenarios are developed hand-in-hand
23 through a series of iterations.

24 25 *8.2.2 Quantitative Scenarios*

26
27 Quantitative scenarios are usually computed by formalized, computer models and provide
28 numerical information in the form of tables, graphs and maps. A disadvantage is that their
29 exactness implies that we know more about the future than we actually do. Another
30 disadvantage is that the models used to compute quantitative scenarios embed many
31 assumptions about the future. These models tend to represent a limited point of view about
32 how the world works (as compared to qualitative scenarios) and therefore provide a narrow
33 view of the future. Furthermore, because not all processes of land use change can be modeled,
34 by definition quantitative scenarios omit these processes. An additional drawback is that the
35 basics of modeling are difficult for the non-specialist to understand.

36
37 There are also advantages of producing quantitative scenarios based on models. Model
38 developers point out that their assumptions about the world are clearly written down in the
39 form of model equations, inputs and coefficients. Although these are not easily
40 understandable to non-experts, the assumptions are at least documented and usually more
41 transparent than the undocumented and unspoken assumptions behind qualitative scenarios.
42 Another advantage of quantitative scenarios based on models is that these models are often
43 published in the scientific literature and have therefore received some degree of scientific
44 scrutiny. The types of models used for computing future land use and cover are presented in
45 Chapter 7 and some of the main techniques used by the models are presented in Box 8.1.

46
47 Since there are convincing arguments for using either qualitative or quantitative scenarios, a
48 popular current approach is to use a combination of both. All of the global scenarios presented
49 later, and some of the regional scenarios, are combined qualitative and quantitative scenarios.

Box 8.1 Main approaches to modeling future land use and cover

Rule based models / cellular automata models - Models usually based on cellular automata (CA) or similar techniques, operating at various spatial-temporal scales. Note that the original CAs operate in a homogenous environment and the states of cells depend only on the states of their neighbors, while CAs used in land use models operate in heterogeneous environments and can also take into account external driving forces such as changes in climate or product markets.

Empirical/statistical models - Both economists and natural scientists employ this category of models, although usually with quite distinct sets of explaining variables or drivers of land use change. These models are typically based on regression techniques using linear or logistic assumptions. The models can be either static (using regression output as final product) or dynamic (using regression output as suitability maps in dynamic allocation procedure).

Agent-based models – These models are usually based on an available agent-simulation library such as SWARM or CORMAS. They are applied to a broad range of themes (deforestation, agriculture, urban growth) and often as part of participatory scenario-building approach. These models are usually used to build local or regional scenarios in which agents represent people, households, or social/ethnic groups.

Macro-economic models - These models are built on general or partial equilibrium sets of macro-economic equations, in which land is not considered in a spatially explicit way, but is usually represented as a production factor. The heterogeneity of land is either ignored, or accounted for by different productivities or yield functions.

Land use accounting models – These models use a spread-sheet program to keep track of the assumptions of a scenario and their consequences on land use/cover. Linear relationships are sometimes used to compute future land use/cover as a function of changing driving forces.

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8.3 Global and Continental Scenarios

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8.3.1 Methodological Issues

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Independent of their type, all scenarios require a coherent set of assumptions for the driving forces of future land use/cover. The driving forces typically used by scenario developers include demographic changes, economic growth and technological development (see Box 8.2). The preparation of these input data is a major undertaking because a large number of internally consistent driving forces must be specified. (Where “internally consistent” is used here to mean driving forces that have consistent trends according to the knowledge of the scenario developer or the assumptions of the scenario.) An example of the large effort needed to specify driving forces for global ecosystem scenarios is given in Nelson et al. (2005). A common strategy for maintaining the internal consistency of driving forces is to first develop storylines, as mentioned above, that provide a logic for the many different assumptions about future changes in population and other drivers. This approach is used in the Environmental Outlook Report (“GEO”) of UNEP (UNEP, 2004) and the Special Report on Emissions (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000a).

1

Box 8.2 Selected drivers specified in land use/change scenarios

Demographic

Population size including migration
Size of urban vs rural population

Economic

Average per capita income
Biofuels demand*
Food demand
Food/crop prices
Food trade
Status of land tenure / farm size**

Technological & Biophysical

Crop yield
Accessibility (infrastructure, travel distance)
Climate
Soil characteristics
Topography

Other Social Factors

Food preferences
Types of governance**
Educational level**

* Typically used only in global/continental scenarios

** Typically used only in regional and local scenarios.

Items without asterisk apply to both global/continental and regional/local scenarios.

2

3 While there are many different ways to model land changes only two of these have been used
4 to develop global scenarios because of data deficiencies, scaling mismatches, or long
5 preparation and run time. The two approaches are land use accounting models (Kemp-
6 Benedict et al., 2002) and rule-based / cellular automata models (Alcamo et al., 1998;
7 Eickhout et al. 2003, IMAGE-Team, 2001) (See Box 8.1 and Chapter 7).

8

9 Figures 8-1 through 8-3 show outcomes of selected global scenarios based on these modeling
10 approaches. Included are scenarios from GEO (UNEP, 2002; UNEP, 2004), SRES (IPCC,
11 2000a), and the Global Scenarios Group (Gallopín et al., 1997; Gallopín and Raskin, 2002;
12 Raskin et al., 2002). We note that comparing scenarios produced with different methods and
13 by different groups raises some methodological problems that should be kept in mind
14 throughout this chapter. For example:

- 15 • The classification of land use/cover is not uniform.
- 16 • Different estimates of initial areal coverage for particular land cover types are used.
- 17 • Different methods (qualitative or quantitative) are used for developing scenarios.

18

19

20

8.3.2 Global Scenario Results

21

22 Most global scenarios show very dynamic changes in agricultural land (Figure 8-1) caused by
23 the tradeoff between food supply and demand as moderated by international trade. Changes in
24 demand for agricultural land are driven by changes in population, income, food preferences
25 and commodity prices, while supply is driven by agricultural management, fertilizer input,
26 soil degradation, and climate-related changes in the biophysical suitability of land for
27 agricultural production.

28

29 Scenarios with a greater extent of agricultural land (Figure 8-1) result from assumptions about
30 high population growth rates together with low but steady economic growth which combine
31 to stimulate large increases in food demand. At the same time assumed slower rates of
32 technological progress lead to slow to negligible increases in crop yield. These combined
33 effects lead to a sizeable expansion (up to 40%) of agricultural land between 1995 and 2100
34 (Figure 8-1). The majority of scenarios show a growth in agricultural land during this period.
35 The scenarios with a smaller extent of agricultural land have lower population assumptions

1 leading to smaller food demands while higher economic growth stimulates technological
2 progress leading to rapid increases in crop yields. The sum of these effects is lower demand
3 for agricultural land, with the lowest scenario showing a decline of more than 20% in the
4 global area of agricultural land. Such large changes could have an important effect on the
5 magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions, release of nutrients and other trace substances to
6 aquatic ecosystems, and other large-scale impacts on the earth system.

7
8 One of the key uncertainties in these scenarios is the question of how the world's population
9 will be fed in the future – Will food come from the *intensification* of agricultural land, that is,
10 by boosting crop yields with increasing fertilizer, irrigation and other inputs, or from
11 *extensification*, by expanding the hectares of cultivated land? How much food will be
12 provided by imports, and conversely, how much agricultural production will be exported? The
13 scenarios presented in Figure 8-2 assumed various degrees of extensification, intensification
14 and world food trade and their wide range reflects the uncertainties of these factors.

15
16 The global forest scenarios largely mirror the agricultural scenarios (Figure 8-2), and illustrate
17 both the positive and negative aspects of existing scenarios. On one hand the forest scenarios
18 are a valuable illustration of the connection between agricultural trends and the future tempo
19 of global deforestation or afforestation. On the other hand, these scenarios imply that forest
20 trends are driven almost exclusively by cropland expansion or contraction. They deal only
21 superficially with driving forces such as global trade in forest products and the establishment
22 of future forest plantations to sequester carbon from the atmosphere. Global scenarios in
23 general need to incorporate many more of the actual driving forces of land use/cover change
24 and in a more realistic way.

25
26 There are very few published global scenarios of changes in urban area (Figure 8-3) and these
27 give a limited view of urban developments. All show a steep increase over the next decade,
28 with about half estimating a stabilization of urban areas by 2025. Stabilization, however,
29 occurs only after urban areas are about 50% larger than their 1995 area. The remaining few
30 scenarios show urban area still expanding at a linear or exponential rate in 2050. The set of
31 scenarios in 2050 shows an increase from 1.5 to 2.5 over the extent of urban land in 1995.
32 These estimates are based on the multiplication of estimates of current urban space
33 requirements per person (for different world regions) times the future trend in urban
34 population (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Hence they do not account for changing spatial
35 requirements of settlement areas.

36
37 Figure 8-4 presents the assumptions of some important drivers of the global scenarios. These
38 are global averages of the values assumed for various world regions. The driver with largest
39 relative increase is income and this affects the change in agricultural area particularly through
40 increases in per capita food consumption. Income growth also influences the assumption for
41 nitrogen fertilizer input and other variables in some scenarios. Assumptions about population
42 growth affect the total crop production (per capita caloric uptake multiplied by population).
43 Note that the assumed growth of population is modest compared to growth of income. The
44 increase in total crop production (assumed or computed across all scenarios) is partly satisfied
45 on new agricultural land and partly by augmenting production on existing land (we return to
46 this issue later). Crop yield increases from 10 to 70% between 1995 and 2050 depending on
47 the scenario, primarily because of an increase of 20 to 70% in the amount of nitrogen fertilizer
48 applied per hectare, and partly because of favorable changes in climate. The global average
49 caloric intake does not significantly increase, although most scenarios assume a marked
50 increase in food consumption in developing parts of the world.

1 We note that driving forces in the global and other scenarios described in this paper are
2 almost always assumed to be external factors that drive land use changes. In reality not only is
3 land use change driven by external factors, but land use change in turn feeds back to these
4 external factors. For example, migrants escaping a threatening political or economic situation
5 outside of a region could be major drivers of changes within a particular region and could
6 eventually cause a depletion of suitable agricultural land which in turn could dampen the
7 migration rate into the region. Including feedbacks to driving forces is an important task for
8 scenario developers and is further discussed in Section 8.6.

9 10 8.3.3 African Scenario Results

11
12 The same tools and approaches used to develop global scenarios have been applied to
13 continental-scale scenarios. To illustrate the differences between trends in developing and
14 developed parts of the world we review scenarios for Africa and Europe. By comparing these
15 regions we also show the consequences of increasing food demand (Africa) and stabilizing
16 food demand (Europe) on future land use/cover.

17
18 The scenarios we review for Africa come from the same references as the global scenarios
19 with the addition of the FAO "Agriculture towards 2015/2030" study (FAO, 2000) and the
20 OECD "Environmental Outlook" study (OECD, 2001). To interpret these scenarios it is useful
21 to examine results for different time periods. Focusing on trends from 1995 to 2025, almost
22 all scenarios indicate a continuous expansion of agricultural land, with an intermediate
23 estimate of 25% and a range from 0% to 45% (Figure 8-5). By comparison, the actual net
24 expansion of agricultural land between 1980 and 1995 was only about 2%. The scenarios,
25 however, take into account the additional agricultural land needed to satisfy both a growing
26 population and a higher per capita food demand arising from accelerating economic growth
27 rates. In addition, some scenarios include large areal demands for biofuel crops as a possible
28 future strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

29
30 Between 2025 and 2050, the scenarios begin to take on more distinctive trends. The higher
31 scenarios show an expansion of agricultural land from 1995 to 2050 of about 40 to 60%,
32 reflecting the assumption of higher population growth (compared to other scenarios) and
33 slower diffusion of technology which hinders Africa from benefiting from advances in
34 agricultural technology. The lower scenarios result from assuming lower population and a
35 vigorous exchange of information, technology, and products across borders which leads to
36 higher economic efficiency of agricultural production and higher crop yields. Comparing
37 2050 to 1995, there is a net increase in agricultural land in all but a few of the scenarios.

38
39 Expanding the time horizon to 2100 (Figure 8-5) reveals clearly-defined turning points at
40 which the trend in agricultural land changes its direction between 2010 and 2050. These
41 turning points occur in several different scenarios and correspond to an eventual slowing of
42 food demand and technological "catch-up" in Africa which accelerates improvements in crop
43 yield. The net effect is a shift from expanding to contracting agricultural land. The fact that
44 these turning points are apparent only after several decades illustrates the importance of
45 considering the long term trend of land use/cover change.

46
47 According to most scenarios, the expansion of agricultural land causes a continuing reduction
48 in African forested land up to 2025 (Figure 8-6) which is likely to have ongoing consequences
49 on biodiversity, water resources, climate and other aspects of Africa's regional environment.
50 Although the scenarios indicate a continuation of deforestation, they also show a slowing of
51 the rate of deforestation. As compared to a rate of 0.8 % per year from 1980 to 1995 (FAO,

1 1999; FAO, 2003), the scenarios show a rate of 0.2% to 0.7% per year between 1995 and
 2 2025. (We note that information presented elsewhere in this book [*Helmut Geist – Please*
 3 *provide appropriate cross-references*] suggests tropical deforestation rates in the 1980s and
 4 90s about 20 to 30% lower than FAO estimates.) However, the scenarios may in general
 5 underestimate deforestation because they do not include a comprehensive description of the
 6 many causes of changing forest land.

7
 8 After 2025 the slowing and eventual reversal of agricultural expansion also results in a further
 9 slowing and reversal of deforestation (Figure 8-6). Some scenarios even show a significant
 10 *expansion* of forested area by 2100 relative to 1995. This raises interesting questions – If the
 11 pressure of expanding cropland is alleviated, can deforestation be reversed within this time
 12 frame? (See Box 8.3). In particular, is it ecologically feasible for tropical forest ecosystems to
 13 re-establish themselves within a few decades as in these scenarios? And what are the
 14 consequences of this reversal on terrestrial biodiversity, the global water cycle and other
 15 aspects of the earth system? By stimulating such questions, scenario analysis provides a
 16 useful input to the research agenda of earth systems science.

17
 Box 8.4 Is a quick reversal of deforestation feasible?

The African scenarios indicate that a slowing and reversal of agricultural land expansion could halt deforestation and lead to reestablishment of the tropical forest within a few decades. Is this realistic? In principle, the answer is, yes, with respect to both biomass accumulation and spatial coverage (e.g. Achard et al. 2002, 2004; IPCC 2000b, Otsamo et al. 1997; Rudel et al. 2005; Silver et al., 2001). In terms of plant biomass and soil carbon, a forest may require longer to recover, from a few decades to a century (Silver et al. 2001). The rate of re- or afforestation at a given site depends on climatic conditions, soil fertility, seed dispersal and in case of managed forests and plantations also management options. Silver et al. (2001) also found that on average tree biomass accumulated fastest on abandoned agricultural land as compared to other types of abandoned land. On the other hand, agricultural land is often abandoned because of soil degradation associated with decreased productivity. In this case Zannei and Chapman (2001) found that the renewal of biomass will take longer than on abandoned agricultural land with soils in good condition. Under any circumstances the restoration of tree biodiversity and forest structure may need a much longer period of time, while other types of biota (insects, herbaceous plants, fungi) may require shorter or longer periods of time to recover, or may not be able to recover at all (as in the case of large mammals requiring large undisturbed habitats).

Regarding the rate of deforestation as compared to afforestation, several of the scenarios for Africa imply that the tempo of these two processes are of the same order of magnitude. By comparison, Rudel et al. 2005, found that observed tropical deforestation is on the average twice as rapid as re- and afforestation, based on a relatively small number of studies of individual countries.

To sum up, some but not all aspects of a tropical forest may be fairly rapidly re-established after the pressures of deforestation are released.

18
 19
 20 The assumptions for the drivers of the African land scenarios are depicted in Figure 8-7. As in
 21 the global case, income grows much faster than population. Average income growth is about a
 22 factor of 6 between 1995 and 2050. Yet this very large growth in income does not translate
 23 into a similarly large increase in caloric intake (10 to 30% during the same period, depending
 24 on the scenario). Apparently the scenarios assume that it is the quality rather than quantity of
 25 food that is lacking in Africa. While the average scenario assumes a population increase of a
 26 factor of 2.6, total crop production increases by a factor of 3, so food production is assumed to
 27 more than keep up with the population. Only for the lowest scenarios does the increase in
 28 population exceed the increase in crop production. In these cases an increase in imported food
 29 partly compensates for the production gap.

1
2 Crop yield grows by an average factor of two, stimulated by the factor of 4 increase of
3 nitrogen fertilizer input per hectare. Increasing yields make it possible to gain part of the new
4 crop production on existing agricultural land. The value of the food self-sufficiency ratio
5 (production divided by production plus consumption) is currently approximately 0.9
6 indicating that Africa is a net importer of food. As shown in Figure 8-7, this ratio will
7 decrease about 10% between 1995 and 2050 across all scenarios indicating a deepening
8 dependence of Africa on food imports.

9 10 *8.3.4 European Scenario Results*

11
12 The European scenarios we review here are the same as the global scenarios with the addition
13 of the following studies: “Ground for Choices” (WRR, 1992), the OECD “Environmental
14 Outlook” (OECD, 2001), and the EURURALIS study (Klijn et al., 2005). The available set of
15 scenarios of Europe’s agricultural land give a wide range of views (Figure 8-8). The lower
16 boundary is set by the “Ground for Choices” study (WRR, 1992) which estimated the impact
17 of steadily decreasing agricultural subsidies up to 2015 and used an optimization approach for
18 agricultural production and labor costs. As a result, these scenarios show 35 to 80% shrinkage
19 in agricultural land relative to 1995. A more typical result is given by the IPCC-SRES
20 scenarios as applied in the EURURALIS Project (Box 8.4) which indicate a decrease of around
21 3 to 6 percent between 1995 and 2030 in the 25 countries of the European Union.

22
23 At the opposite extreme, the highest IPCC-SRES scenario suggests that expanding the export
24 of agricultural commodities from Europe could result in a 35% expansion of agricultural land
25 (relative to 1995). The scenarios in-between do not show large changes up to 2025.
26 Afterwards, however, they exhibit a wide range of different trends and views about the future.
27 The fact that most scenarios begin to diverge only after 2025 is another illustration of the
28 importance of incorporating a longer time horizon for studies of future land use and cover.
29 Some agricultural scenarios show a change in direction but this occurs later than in the
30 African scenarios.

31
32 Similar to the agricultural scenarios, the forest scenarios do not show large changes up to
33 2025, but sharply diverge afterwards (Figure 8-9). Several long term scenarios show a
34 reversal in the trend of decreasing forest area at mid-century in response to declining
35 agricultural land area. The rate of reforestation is slower here than in the African forest
36 scenarios (Figure 8-6), and may be feasible because of the heavy management of Europe’s
37 forests.

38
39 Estimates of future forest coverage in most studies are computed in the same way as in the
40 global and African scenarios in that changes in forest area only mirror changes in agricultural
41 area. Most forest scenarios neglect the factors that determine the extent of forest area in
42 Europe such as policies for nature protection and landscape preservation, forest management
43 practices, and trade in wood products. (An exception are the EURURALIS scenarios shown in
44 Box 8.4 which examine European land use policies in detail and computed ongoing
45 abandonment of agricultural land and an increase in “natural land” which is likely to include
46 new forest areas). Another deficit is that forest scenarios of Europe and other regions usually
47 do not distinguish between primary and secondary forests which have dissimilar roles in the
48 regulation of the water cycle, the support of species, and other global change processes.

49
50 The assumed rate of change of driving forces in Europe (Figure 8-10) are more moderate than
51 for Africa (Figure 8-7). This applies in general to developed versus developing regions in

1 existing scenarios and reflects the thinking that Europe and other industrialized parts of the
2 world will materially develop much less in the coming decades than Africa and other
3 developing regions. Perhaps this is a too narrow a view of the future since it is imaginable that
4 various social, economic or political events could narrow or widen the gap in growth between
5 developed and developing countries.

6
7 Population growth assumptions range from a small decrease to a small increase, while income
8 growth ranges from a factor of 1.5 to 3.3 from 1995 to 2050 (for the various scenarios). In the
9 case of Europe (as other industrialized world regions) the increase in income does not
10 translate into an increase in caloric intake since this is already at its saturation level. Crop
11 yields modestly increase, because of improved agricultural management, and because of
12 increased fertilizer input in some scenarios. The average scenario assumes that nitrogen
13 fertilizer input remains constant, while the lowest assumes a decrease of 30% and the highest
14 an increase of 50% between 1995 and 2050. Europe is currently a net food import area (self-
15 sufficiency ratio = 0.95) and this will increase according to the scenarios by an average factor
16 of 1.2 between 1995 and 2050, thus making Europe a net exporter of food products.

Box 8.4 European scenarios (2000-2030) from the EURURALIS Project.


EURURALIS was sponsored by the Netherlands as part of its chairmanship of the European Union in 2004 with the aim to analyze potential land use/cover change in Europe (Klijn et al., 2005). Four scenarios were evaluated based on the IPCC SRES global storylines. A number of models were used to translate the scenarios into high resolution assessments of changes for the 25 countries of the European Union. Global economic and integrated assessment models (GTAP and IMAGE) were used to calculate changes in demand for agricultural areas at the national level, while a spatially explicit land use model (CLUE-S) was used to translate these demands into land use patterns (van Meijl, et al. 2005).

The table below shows the area of the EU-25 facing urbanization, agricultural land abandonment, and/or new “natural land”. The maps below illustrate how the incorporation of spatial policies results in very different land use patterns (1 _ 1 km²) for southern France. In the B2 scenario (Regional Communities), the Less Favoured Areas (shaded areas in 2000 map which indicate areas of low productivity) are maintained leading to incentives for continuation of arable agriculture, thus slowing land abandonment in these areas. In the B1 scenario (Global Cooperation), the Less Favoured Areas are only incentives for managed grasslands, which leads to an almost complete disappearance of agriculture in these areas. Thus, patterns of land use change are very different, although the overall percentage of change is similar.


Change in land use between 2000 and 2030 (As percentage of total land area of EU-25)

	A1	A2	B1	B2
Urban land	2.4	1.4	1.3	0.4
Agricultural land abandoned	6.4	2.5	6.3	5.2
“Natural land”	2.1	0.6	4.6	3.2


2000



2030: B1 scenario



2030: B2 scenario



8.4 Regional and Local Scenarios

8.4.1 Methodological issues

The variety and number of regional and local land use scenarios is much larger than global scenarios. This variety is caused primarily by the much wider range of locally-specific questions that are being addressed and locally-specific factors determining land use and cover. Other causes are methodological problems mentioned earlier and varying availability of reliable data.

On one hand, regional studies of future land use have objectives similar to that of global studies in that they also offer insight into the consequences of current actions and uncertainties of the future and thus support more informed and rational decision-making. On the other hand, while global studies tend to focus on producing scenarios, regional studies often concentrate on developing tools for direct decision support because in principle land use change can be steered by local stakeholders (see Peterson et al., 2003).

Regional scenarios also differ from global scenarios with respect to the basic questions they address. Whereas global scenarios tend to ask *how much* land use change will take place, regional scenarios tend to address *where* it will take place. Although Lambin et al. (2000) suggest that the magnitude of change might be more informative than its location, most regional scenario studies have in practice focused on the location of change and have employed spatially-explicit models to map this change. A typical procedure is to first develop storylines that specify the trends of socio-economic, environmental and institutional variables determining land use, as well as the resulting direction or even order of magnitude of land use change. Quantitative models are then used to allocate *where* the land use change will take place, consistent with the trends specified in the storyline.

The typical drivers included in regional and local scenarios are similar to those used in global scenarios but, of course, are described in much greater detail. In comparison to global scenarios, regional and local storylines often include governance issues, technology, and changes in the social system. These translate into similar quantitative drivers, although data on social issues are often limited and economic drivers (income, trade, subsidies, prices) dominate. The location of change is determined by a range of factors, including biophysical (for example topography, soil, and/or precipitation), demographic (population, accessibility), and socio-economic (land tenure, education level). The determining mix of factors depends on local characteristics. In Brazil, for example, the distance of development to road is very often the most important factor, boosted by the launch of the “Avança Brasil” which involves very high investments for road paving (e.g. Alves, 2001; Laurance et al., 2001). By comparison, European scenarios would not be complete without including the effects of the Common Agricultural Policy, while many studies single out soil characteristics as the main determinant of land use (e.g. Bakker et al., 2005).

Although the diversity of drivers is high, population is the single most frequently mentioned driving force, both in determining quantity and location of change (e.g. Kok, 2004). Published land use scenarios, however, still tend to simplify the impacts of population because of lack of data, despite a strong plea from the Lucc community that population will hardly ever be the key single driver (Lambin et al., 2001). Recently, more complex measurements of accessibility (Verburg et al., 2004), income and education level are being included in land use models.

1 In the following paragraphs we review a small selection of the many regional and local
2 scenarios that have been developed. To minimize the problems of interpreting scenarios based
3 on different methodologies, we review only the sub-set of scenarios which fulfill one or more
4 of the following conditions: (i) They are embedded in regional and/or global developments
5 (e.g. scenarios produced by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment or EURURALIS); (ii) They
6 were developed using a single framework/methodology applied at different locations (e.g.
7 scenarios based on the CLUE, SLEUTH, or Environment Explorer models); (iii) They have
8 employed a proven methodology such as the cellular automata approach; and/or (iv) They are
9 considered “archetypal” scenarios for a particular location.

12 *8.4.2 Results from Regional and Local Scenarios*

14 While most global/continental scenarios have a long perspective (usually up to 2050, some up
15 to 2100), most regional/local scenarios are short term (usually up to 2015, some up to 2025).
16 However, there are exceptions as we see later. Short term scenarios tend to be extrapolations
17 of current trends, while long term scenarios are usually derived from a top-down, multi-scale
18 methodology and incorporate non-linear system changes and feedbacks. We begin with a
19 review of short term regional scenarios.

21 The picture that emerges from many short term studies is not encouraging from the point-of-
22 view of environmental change. In Latin America, the vast majority of scenarios indicate that
23 deforestation will continue unabated, although there are exceptions (e.g. Fearnside, 2003).
24 Examples of regional deforestation scenarios are given in Box 8.5 Growing populations,
25 expanding economies and increasing urbanization characterize the situation in Southeast Asia
26 (Roetter et al., 2005). The few available regional scenarios for Africa (e.g. Thornton et al.,
27 2003) suggest that further increases in population and income will change dietary preferences
28 and boost food demand. Since increasing food demand cannot be easily covered by boosting
29 crop productivity and imports and hence agricultural land will greatly expand. This is
30 consistent with the results of most continental-scale African scenarios (Figure 8-5) which
31 indicate a strong expansion of agricultural land over the coming few decades. However, as
32 noted above, the continental scenarios show a slowing of this expansion and its eventual
33 reversal over a longer time period.

35 In North America, the focus of land research has traditionally been on monitoring current
36 land-use/cover change and describing historical changes, thus gaining understanding of the
37 current patterns of land use and important (historical) drivers of change. Recently, however,
38 the emphasis has shifted to scenario development. Examples are the work of spatial
39 economists (e.g. Irwin and Bockstael, 2004); the use of agent-based models in the SLUCE
40 project (Spatial Land Use Change and Ecological Effects at the Rural-Urban Interface, see
41 Brown et al., 2004); and the applications of the urban growth model SLEUTH (Clarke and
42 Gaydos, 1998). Land use research is coordinated in a number of research programmes,
43 notably NASA's Land Cover Land Use Change Program (Gutman et al., 2004); the Human-
44 Environment Regional Observatories (HERO); and the US Global Change Research Program
45 Element, Land Use/Land Cover Change (USGCSP, 2003) with a particular emphasis on the
46 future impact of climate change on crop productivity. It is to be expected that the number of
47 land scenarios will increase rapidly in the near future.


49 Short term scenarios of European regions have analyzed the impact of the recent expansion of
50 the European Union from 15 to 25 countries (e.g. Kohler, 2004) and of the European
51 Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (see Topp and Mitchell, 2003;

1 ACCELERATES, 2004). These scenarios indicate a continuation of urbanization and land
 2 abandonment, together with further land and water quality degradation.
 3
 4

Box 8.5 Scenarios (2000-2010) of deforestation in Central America

The quantitative scenarios of deforestation in Central America depicted below were derived through a multi-step procedure. First, qualitative storylines for Central America were written based on information and requests from experts and decision makers (Business as Usual, Market Liberalization, Sustainability). The storylines were then quantified using FAOSTAT data. Finally, these data were input to the CLUE model (Verburg et al., 1999) which produced quantitative estimates of deforestation (Kok and Veldkamp, 2000; Kok and Winograd, 2002).

The bar graph below shows that deforestation rates remain high between 2000 and 2010. Although national level rates are lower in Central America than in the Brazilian Amazon, local rates (e.g. the Atlantic coast of Costa Rica) are as high. The “Sustainable” scenario was formulated at the request of national policy makers and is a normative scenario. Despite the strong interest in a scenario with a reversal of deforestation, the quantification of this scenario indicated that deforestation is likely to continue in the short run in Costa Rica and Panama. During quantification it was assumed that “sustainability” measures (e.g. institutionalization of national parks, and changes in dietary patterns) only occur when the economy grows fast and human well-being is increased. But higher income and well-being also stimulate a higher demand for beef which leads to an expansion of grazing land, and hence to continuing deforestation. Moreover, the sustainability scenario was not considered feasible by experts and decision makers involved in the scenario studies because it assumed that current trends of land use policies, dietary patterns, and crop yield could be reversed within the next decade.



5
 6

1
2 One set of long term studies of local land use changes have focused on potential changes in
3 agricultural areas up to 2100. For example, as a result of climate change the corn and wheat
4 belts in North America may shift northward, reducing US production of these crops and
5 increasing their production in Canada. (IPCC, 1997). These studies analyze potential impacts
6 on land use, but do not provide an integrated view of land use changes incorporating socio-
7 economic developments.

8
9 Another set of long term studies focus on downscaling and applying global scenarios to the
10 regional and local scale. Many of these studies have downscaled the IPCC SRES scenarios
11 (IPCC, 2000a. These include the work of the ATEAM project (Rounsevell et al., 2005) and the
12 EURURALIS project mentioned earlier (Klijn et al., 2005; see Box 8.4). Other examples are the
13 application of SLEUTH in the US (Solecki and Oliveri, 2004); land use scenarios for the
14 Netherlands (Kuhlman et al., 2003; De Nijs et al., 2004); and a local landscape study in
15 Norfolk, England (Dockerty et al., 2005).

16
17 An important characteristic of regional and local scenarios is that they sometimes show
18 solutions to global change problems that are overlooked by the coarse resolution of global
19 scenarios. For example, local policies may effectively slow down deforestation in Brazil
20 (Fearnside, 2003), and crop-farming can be replaced by fish-farming in flooded areas in the
21 Netherlands (White et al., 2004). Such local solutions could have a global impact if they
22 propagate throughout the world.

23 24 25 *8.4.3 Results from Urban Scenarios*

26
27 The analysis of spatial developments in urban areas has proceeded separately from the
28 regional and local studies mentioned above, and merits a separate discussion. The most
29 common approach used for producing urban scenarios is cellular automata modeling because
30 of its flexibility in handling “rules” that determine changes in urban areas. Other approaches
31 include the “land transformation model” of Pijanowski et al. (2002) and the agent-based
32 model of Brown et al. (2004).

33
34 Up to now, urban scenarios have concentrated on future expansion of urban land, an
35 important issue in both developed and developing countries. Over the last decades urban
36 populations in developed countries have been moving from dense, compact urban centers to
37 new low-density urban areas on the outskirts of present cities. Meanwhile, a combination of
38 high population growth and lack of (urban) planning has led to a large expansion of urban
39 land in many developing countries. One of the main messages of urban scenarios is that urban
40 land will continue to expand at many different locations. Some scenario studies (e.g.
41 Pijanowski et al., 2002) also suggest that the expansion of urban area may lead to a greater-
42 than-proportional loss in fertile farmland – New urban areas not only occupy the best
43 agricultural lands but also attract industry and infrastructure that claim an additional share of
44 former rural land. These changes are of particular importance since they are usually
45 irreversible over a long time period.

46
47 Scenario analysis has also shown that urban sprawl, and its opposite “compact growth”, could
48 lead to many different plausible spatial patterns of urban growth. The recent EURURALIS
49 project (Klijn et al., 2005) considered different variants of sprawl- and compact-type growth
50 in European cities (Table 8.1) and found that factors such as local city planning policies have
51 an important effect on the particular spatial pattern resulting from sprawl or compact growth.

1 The EURURALIS scenarios also indicated that urbanization rates are likely to remain high until
 2 2030 under the downscaled assumptions of the four IPCC-SRES scenarios (IPCC, 2000a)
 3 (Table 8.1). Solecki and Oliveri (2004) reached similar conclusions for the New York
 4 Metropolitan Region by downscaling two of the same four IPCC-SRES scenarios.

5
 6 Table 8.1 Assumptions for characteristics of urban growth in the EU-25 between 2000 and 2030 from
 7 EURURALIS Project. Scenarios are downscaled urban versions of the IPCC SRES (IPCC, 2000a) storylines.
 8

	A1	A2	B1	B2
Type of urban growth	Sprawled	Sprawled	Compact	Compact
Large cities	No restrictions	No restrictions	Designated areas only	Designated areas only
Provincial towns	No incentives or restrictions	No incentives or restrictions	Designated areas only	Designated areas only
Small villages	Proliferation of second houses	Decrease in land abandonment regions	Designated areas only	Maintain size and structure

9 10 11 8.4.4 Results from Multi-scale Scenarios

12
 13 The close connection between future land use on the global and regional scales argues for the
 14 development of integrated global-regional land use scenarios. The Millennium Ecosystem
 15 Assessment (MA) took first steps in this direction by constructing parallel global and regional
 16 land use scenarios as part of their multi-scale assessment of ecosystem services (MA, 2003).
 17 The MA effort provides experience on how to set up a multi-scale scenarios exercise. Figure
 18 8-11 shows two different multi-scale organizational structures used in the MA, a fully
 19 hierarchically nested design (southern Africa) and a partly nested design (Portugal). Two
 20 parallel scenario exercises were conducted. On the global level, a global scenarios team
 21 developed four scenarios, which can be described by two axes of uncertainty (global versus
 22 regional development, and proactive versus reactive actions relative to environmental
 23 degradation). To drive the scenarios a set of global driving forces with country-scale
 24 resolution were selected. On the regional level different regional scenario teams developed
 25 regional scenarios using the driving forces from the global scenario exercise as one of many
 26 inputs to their scenarios. While the global scenario exercise provided input to the regional
 27 scenarios, the regional scenarios were completed too late to provide feedback to the global
 28 scenarios.

29
 30 Experience from the Portugal scenario exercise illustrates the difficulty in harmonizing
 31 regional and global scenarios. The global scenario “Global Orchestration” reflects a world of
 32 economic optimism in which farming areas are mostly located where production is highest
 33 and most efficient. When translated to Portugal by the regional scenarios team, this scenario
 34 described a future in which regional agriculture is abandoned and replaced by oak forests,
 35 rural population migrates to cities and the expansion of uncultivated land leads to greater
 36 biodiversity. While international stakeholders consider Global Orchestration as a desirable
 37 scenario, Portuguese policy-makers had the opposite view because of the loss of rural
 38 employment and economic activity.

39
 40 The Visions project (Rotmans et al., 2000) is another example of multi-scale scenarios, this
 41 time at the pan-European and local scales. Scenarios were first developed independently at the
 42 two scales and then mapped onto each other. Local scenarios tended to be generally positive
 43 and include local solutions to future challenges because of the multi-scale design (which
 44 encourages broad global and local thinking) and because of the involvement of stakeholders

1 (who were interested in local solutions). In the Green Heart region in the Netherlands, for
2 instance, agricultural entrepreneurs exploit more frequent extreme rainfall events and flooding
3 by shifting their future focus to fish-farming (see White et al., 2004). In a subsequent project
4 (MedAction; De Groot and Rotmans, 2004) the three European scenarios were translated to fit
5 land use issues (Kok et al., 2003) and were downscaled to the Mediterranean region (Kok and
6 Rothman, 2003). Again, local scenarios tended to be a mix of higher-level changes and local
7 innovative solutions. In the Guadalentín in Spain, water transport networks are projected to
8 sustain agriculture, while in the Agri Valley ecotourism is integrated with small-scale
9 agriculture (Kok and Patel, 2003).

10
11 The MA and Visions scenario exercises are just two of an increasing number of multi-scale
12 scenario exercises. As mentioned earlier, many groups are downscaling global scenarios from
13 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000a), the Millennium Ecosystem
14 Assessment (MA, 2003) and the Global Environmental Outlook of UNEP (UNEP, 2004). One
15 point of view is that downscaling a limited set of global scenarios is better than a “bottom up”
16 approach in which stakeholders help to develop local scenarios, in that downscaling provides
17 a common, consistent framework for scenarios at many different locales and regions (e.g.
18 time horizon, time steps, categories of driving forces, definitions of land use terms). Thus it
19 makes the scenarios from these places more comparable.

20
21 Another point of view is that global downscaling limits the creativity and diversity of regional
22 scenarios. An example of this can be found in a number of downscaling efforts in Europe. The
23 “Less Favored Areas” are defined as agricultural areas that are economically marginal.
24 Therefore, they provide a useful spatial indicator of non-optimal production areas (Rounsevell
25 et al., 2005). This idea was implemented in a similar fashion in several studies – in the
26 ATEAM studies (Rounsevell et al., 2005), in EURURALIS (Box 8.4), in applications of the
27 Land Use Scanner (Kuhlman et al., 2003) and in applications of the Environment Explorer
28 (De Nijs et al., 2004). All these studies downscaled continental or global scenarios and used
29 the Less Favored Areas concept as a means to make the effect of the Common Agricultural
30 Policy spatially explicit. Because spatial policies strongly and directly affect land use patterns,
31 these similarities carried over in the resulting land use maps. The influence of the continental
32 or global scenarios might be overly strong, thus weakening the local and regional signals.
33 Based on the authors’ experience, regional scenario exercises that emphasize stakeholder
34 participation tend to stress local and regional factors and produce more diverse results.

35
36 To sum up, the multi-scale approach seems to be a promising method to standardize and
37 harmonize local, regional and global studies, but it has only recently been given adequate
38 attention. Many more studies are needed before any final conclusion on its usefulness can be
39 drawn.

40 41 42 **8.5 Main Findings of Scenarios**

43
44 Although the scientific community is only beginning to study the future of land, the existing
45 set of scenarios offers interesting insights to researchers. These scenarios range from the
46 global/continental to regional/local and take the form of qualitative “storylines” and/or
47 quantitative model output. The set of existing scenarios cover a wide variety of possible
48 driving forces up to 2100. They present “not implausible” futures of land use without making
49 assertions about the probabilities of these futures.

1 There are some notable differences between global and regional scenarios. The published
2 global scenarios have been based on only two modeling approaches – accounting and rule-
3 based/cellular automata models while the regional scenarios have used a wider variety of
4 approaches. The global scenarios tend to be more expert driven, and cover a smaller set of
5 potential futures than the regional scenarios. Global scenarios tend to be long term, while
6 regional scenarios tend to be short term. Most of the global scenarios derived up to now
7 mostly follow a few archetypical ideas of coming developments such as the continuation of
8 current globalization trends or the reversal of globalization and collapse of international
9 cooperation. Regional scenarios, because of their focus on smaller and more specific localities
10 or regions, have tended to be more stakeholder driven. For these reasons they also encompass
11 a larger variety of views of the future, including the potential influence of local policy and
12 institutions. However, it is usually difficult for developers of regional scenarios to set the
13 physical/political boundaries of their scenarios, whereas developers of global scenarios do not
14 have this problem. Global scenarios, by nature, focus on international, large-scale solutions to
15 undesirable global change, while regional scenarios illustrate local solutions that may be
16 overlooked by the coarse resolution of global scenarios.

17
18 Taken together, current land scenarios support the idea that fine, “local” spatial patterns of
19 land use change tend to be determined by local factors (e.g. city planning policies, local
20 recreational preferences or topography), while the overriding forces for change come from
21 outside drivers (e.g. world food trade, or society-wide changes in food preferences). This
22 perspective is implicit in many scenarios and has an important influence on their results. The
23 validity of these assumptions should be checked with empirical data.

24
25 The diversity of regional and local land use scenarios makes it difficult to summarize their
26 main findings. But in their diversity may lie their strength in that regional and local scenarios
27 provide a rich variety of different “bottom-up” views of the future. Nevertheless, constraining
28 the range of regional and local scenarios by downscaling them from global scenarios has the
29 advantage of making local land use scenarios more consistent and comparable. The relative
30 benefits and costs of these two approaches must be further discussed. It may even be possible
31 to link global and regional scenarios in a way so that both gain from the other (see “Towards
32 Better Land Scenarios”).

33 34 *Changes in Extent of Urban Land.*

35
36 Scenarios have been developed for both the sum of global/continental changes in urban area,
37 as well as for changes in the area of individual cities. The published scenarios of both types
38 indicate a continuing increase in urban area over the decade 2000-2010, but some scenarios
39 show a stabilization of global urban area by 2025. We remind the reader that scenarios are if-
40 then propositions of what could occur given certain assumptions, and that different
41 population, economic, and other assumptions could lead to scenarios of decreasing urban
42 area. Nevertheless, for the range of assumptions adopted in the literature, urban area shows a
43 global increase over at least the coming decade.

44
45 Regional and local scenarios also show that urbanization could lead to many different fine-
46 scale patterns of land use in a metropolitan areas. Some scenarios also show that fertile
47 agricultural land could disappear at a faster rate than the expansion of urban area because of
48 the additional infrastructure and other land requirements of the urban population.

49 50 51 *Changes in Extent of Agricultural Land.*

1
2 The focus of most scenarios is on changing agricultural land, probably because agriculture is
3 so important economically and politically. Many scenarios emphasize the link between
4 deforestation and agricultural land. The great majority of both regional and global scenarios
5 indicate an expansion of agricultural land over the next decade, with the biggest changes
6 occurring in the tropics. But many global scenarios also show turning points at which the
7 trend in agricultural land changes its direction some time between 2010 and 2050. Many
8 African scenarios point to an eventual slowing of population growth and technological “catch-
9 up” which accelerates improvements in crop yield. The net effect is a shift from expanding to
10 contracting agricultural land. If realized, this reversal in trends could relieve some of the
11 pressure on existing unmanaged natural land and have positive consequences for biodiversity.

12
13 Although turning points are not implausible, up to now they have only been generated as a
14 consequence of the input assumptions of scenarios and hence require empirical validation.
15 Indeed, both scenarios and models require more rigorous descriptions of the future impacts of
16 increasing food demand and depletion of suitable agricultural land. Another key uncertainty
17 has to do with the way in which future food demand will be satisfied – Will it be by
18 expanding agricultural land, by intensification of existing land, or by world food trade? Much
19 more research work is needed on this issue so that agricultural scenarios can capture a fuller
20 range of possible futures.

21 22 *Changes in Extent of Forest Land*

23
24 The majority of regional scenarios indicate a continued rapid deforestation in many parts of
25 Africa and Latin America over the next decade. Most global scenarios also show this short
26 term trend, but in addition suggest an eventual slowing of deforestation after a few decades as
27 a result of the slowing of agricultural land expansion. This has important implications for
28 carbon dioxide fluxes and other global change processes. Some scenarios for Africa even
29 show a relatively rapid reversal of deforestation which raises the interesting question, is it
30 ecologically feasible for tropical forest ecosystems to re-establish themselves within a few
31 decades suggested by these scenarios?

32
33 Large-scale forest scenarios tend to mirror agricultural scenarios in that forest land coverage
34 is determined mostly (in the scenarios) by the expansion or contraction of agricultural land.
35 This, of course, is an exaggerated simplification of reality, and future scenarios must take into
36 account other factors that influence forest land such as conventional management practices
37 (e.g. wood extraction), unconventional management practices (e.g. plantations for carbon
38 sequestration), and protected areas of forests. Moreover, most existing global and regional
39 scenarios do not distinguish between primary and secondary forests, which play different
40 roles in the regulation of the water cycle, the support of species, and other global change
41 processes.

42 43 *Consequences for the Earth System*

44
45 Taken together, the set of published scenarios imply that major changes in the earth’s land
46 cover over the next decades are not implausible. These changes have large implications for
47 the global water system (through modification of moisture and energy fluxes), for the rate of
48 climate change (through changes in various climatic processes and in emissions of methane,
49 nitrous oxide and other greenhouse gases), for biodiversity (through impacts on the integrity
50 of habitats), for the global carbon cycle (through modifications in terrestrial carbon fluxes),
51 and for other aspects of the earth system.

8.6 Towards Better Land Scenarios

Although existing scenarios have served the needs of different audiences from local farmers to global policy makers, we have pointed out in the previous text that there are substantial opportunities for improvement. But what direction should these improvements take? We suggest that goal of improvements should be to enhance the following four characteristics of scenarios. (This list builds on the three criteria (salience, credibility, legitimacy) for quality control of integrated assessment presented by Jill Jäger at the Workshop on “Scenarios of the Future, the Future of Scenarios”, Kassel, Germany, July, 2002):

- *Relevance* – Is the scenario relevant to its audience? Are the particular needs of the potential users addressed? The range of audiences for land scenarios is very wide, extending from the community interested in global change processes (and land use/cover change, in particular), to the concern of regional planners about local land use changes.
- *Credibility* – Is the scenario plausible to its principal audience and developers? Are the statements and causal relationships consistent with existing information? Are the assumptions about the causal relationships underlying the qualitative scenarios (mental models) or quantitative scenarios (formalized models) transparent? Is the scientific rigor and methods used to develop the scenarios acceptable? Is the credibility of scenario developers high enough?
- *Legitimacy* – Does the scenario reflect points of view that are perceived to be fair by scenario users, or does the scenario promote particular beliefs, values or agendas? Was the process for developing scenarios perceived to be fair? Are the process and results adequately documented? (These factors are also important to the credibility of scenarios.)
- *Creativity* – Do the scenarios provoke new, creative thinking? Do they challenge current views about the future? (If this challenge is justified). Do they inform their audience about the implications of uncertainty?

The following paragraphs propose a range of actions for producing better scenarios by enhancing these characteristics:

1. Expand the Scope of Scenarios

While existing scenarios cover some of the basic dynamics of changing land use and cover, they still incorporate only a small fraction of the processes determining these dynamics. An important way to improve the *credibility* and *relevance* of scenarios would be to expand their scope to include more land use/cover processes. By including more processes the scenarios will gain scientific *credibility* because they are more likely to capture the driving forces and dynamics that will determine future land use/cover changes. Likewise, covering more processes will make the scenarios more *relevant* to a wider range of scientific and policy users.

In the following paragraphs we recommend six priorities for expanding the scope of scenarios.

- *Describe in more detail the factors determining the extent of future agricultural land.* As noted earlier in this chapter, most land scenarios focus on agricultural land because of its economic and political importance. However, most of these scenarios are based on simplified assumptions about future farm management, crop yield and other factors that will determine the extent of future agricultural land. The credibility and relevance of agricultural land scenarios would be enhanced if scenario builders provided a more

1 detailed rationale for future trends in these factors. In particular, scenario builders should
2 draw on either conceptual or formalized models to estimate future productivity of crop
3 and grasslands, the future importance of new crops such as bio-energy plants, and the
4 tradeoff between future agricultural intensification and extensification.

- 5 • *Give more attention to non-agricultural land.* While the current focus of scenarios on
6 agricultural land is understandable, neglecting other types of land results in an incomplete
7 picture of future land use and cover. Land cover with natural vegetation (forests,
8 grasslands) is often treated in scenarios as a remnant land cover classes (areas not needed
9 for other purposes). Hence greater attention should be given to future changes of non-
10 agricultural land (forest, grassland, urban). In addition, more attention should be given to
11 realistically representing competition between land cover types since many future policy
12 interventions affect the availability of land (conservation of nature, carbon plantations,
13 livelihood of rural areas, renewable energy etc.).
- 14 • *Incorporate more detail about driving forces.* Most land scenarios are driven by
15 assumptions about external factors such as population, economic growth, and
16 technological development. Although these factors are usually prescribed *ad hoc*, the
17 reality is that they are affected by a host of other factors. The realism of land scenarios,
18 and thereby their credibility and relevance, would be enhanced by including more detail
19 and realism about future trends in these driving forces. Examples are:
 - 20 - The effect of social and cultural attitudes on food consumption, on land use practices
21 (e.g. farming systems), and on the priority given to the conservation of natural
22 resources.
 - 23 - The impact of labor, capital and global food trade on agricultural production.
 - 24 - The effect of traditions and practices of land tenure on land use patterns.
 - 25 - The effect of shifts of population from rural areas to urban or vice versa.
- 26 • *Incorporate feedbacks into driving forces.* In reality not only is land use driven by
27 external factors, but land use change in turn affects feeds back to these external factors.
28 An example of such a feedback was given In Section 8.3.2. A key task for scenario
29 developers is to incorporate the feedback from land use change to external drivers,
30 drawing on new knowledge about these feedbacks. This task can be achieved by
31 modifying the models used to generate the scenarios. One way to modify the models
32 would be to convert external drivers into internal variables in the model. Another way is
33 to insert a switch in the model that indicates when “unrealistic” land use change is
34 computed. This switch would then send a signal to automatically modify the external
35 drivers so that more “realistic” land use change is computed.
- 36 • *Include extreme events and changes in their periodicity.* It is generally understood that
37 flooding, fire and other extreme events have a profound but transient impact on land use
38 and land cover (e.g., Kauffman, 2004; Kok and Winograd, 2002; Cochrane et al, 1999).
39 At the same time a single event usually does not have a persistent effect on land cover
40 over the scale of several years because vegetation and ecosystems tend to re-establish
41 themselves after such events, But it is also observed that *recurrent* extreme events can
42 have an important influence on permanent land cover (e.g., Nepstad et al., 2004; van
43 Nordwijk et al., 2004; Sorrensen, 2004; Correira et al., 1999). One example is the role of
44 periodic brush fires in determining the vegetation in chaparral landscapes. Hence rather
45 than including *single* extreme events in scenarios, it would be more consistent with
46 current thinking to include a *change in periodicity* of extreme events (if appropriate for
47 the setting of the scenarios). Including extreme events in this way could make them more
48 thought-provoking and thereby enhance their creativity.

- 1 • *Inform stakeholders about the limitations of models.* A problem related to the limited
2 scope of models is the communication problem that arises when stakeholders specify that
3 a land scenario has 15 driving forces, but the model used to quantify the scenarios can
4 only handle 5 of these driving forces. This is just one of the many mismatches that
5 typically occur between the mental models of stakeholders and the simpler formalized
6 models used for quantification of scenarios. This mismatch takes away from the
7 consistency and credibility of the scenarios. In this case a partial solution is simple – The
8 model teams should inform stakeholders about the limitations of the models at an early
9 stage of scenario development. The stakeholders then have the option of taking into
10 account these limitations. Another option is to use simple, flexible models that can be
11 adjusted quickly to the specifications of stakeholders during a scenario exercise.

12 2. Use Participatory Approaches to Scenario Development.

13 We believe that the *relevance*, *legitimacy* and *creativity* of scenarios can be enhanced by
14 developing them in partnership with stakeholders (i.e. individuals or organizations with a
15 special interest in the outcomes of the scenarios). This is called the “participatory approach”
16 to scenario development, as described earlier in the chapter. Typical of this approach is the
17 use of a scenario panel consisting of stakeholders and experts to carry out the core work of
18 scenario development.
19
20

21
22 How does the participatory approach enhance the *relevance*, *legitimacy* and *creativity* of
23 scenarios? By including some of the potential users of the scenarios in the scenario panel (the
24 stakeholders), the scenarios have a higher chance of addressing *relevant* policy questions.
25 Since these stakeholders represent the different interest groups concerned with scenario
26 outcomes, their participation also enhances the *legitimacy* of the scenarios. The participatory
27 approach can also produce more *creative* scenarios because the wide range of views
28 represented on the scenario panel often lead to new combinations of views about the future
29 that are incorporated into less conventional and more creative scenarios.
30

31 However, a key to making scenarios more relevant, legitimate and creative is to ensure that
32 the scenario panel is made up of a wide, and representative group of stakeholders and experts.
33 Otherwise the scenario panel may be perceived as being biased towards one interest or
34 another, thus undermining the credibility and legitimacy of the scenarios they produce.
35 Moreover, a scenario panel with biased views will also narrow the scope and creativity of the
36 scenarios they generate.
37

38 3. Improve the Transparency and Documentation of Scenarios

39
40 In this paragraph we return to the question of how to maximize the *credibility* of scenarios.
41 Sometimes credibility is associated with likelihood (the more likely a scenario, the higher its
42 credibility) but this does not always hold for scenarios for two reasons. First, information
43 about the likelihood of a scenario is usually not available. (For example, the authors of the
44 IPCC emission scenarios explicitly advise scenario users that no likelihood should be
45 assigned to the different scenarios; IPCC, 2000a). Second, even unlikely scenarios can serve a
46 useful purpose, as in the case of low-probability scenarios of accidents in nuclear power
47 plants which are useful for developing accident contingency plans. Hence, the *credibility* of a
48 scenario is not always related to its likelihood.
49

50 As an alternative, we believe that the *credibility* of a scenario can be associated with its
51 internal logic, consistency and coherence. That is, the more logical, consistent and coherent

1 the scenario, the higher its credibility. In turn, this logic, consistency and coherence must be
2 “transparent” through the clear documentation of a scenario’s basic assumptions, internal
3 structure, and driving forces. This is a special challenge for qualitative scenarios because they
4 are usually expressions of the complex mental models of stakeholders. To make the
5 assumptions behind these scenarios more transparent it may be possible to use well-
6 established techniques of “soft systems research” that formalize human thinking and decision
7 processes (e.g. Fischwick and Luker, 1991; Checkland, 1981). Another possible approach is
8 to use spatial and/or historical analogs of the events in a scenario. In the case that models are
9 used to generate scenarios, the credibility of the scenario can be enhanced by documenting the
10 model and its assumptions in peer-reviewed scientific literature.

11 12 4. Build Interactive Scenarios

13
14 Another approach to increase the *credibility* of scenarios is to build “interactive” scenarios.
15 This type of scenarios would increase the credibility of scenarios in general because they
16 provide a more realistic representation of the driving forces of scenarios.

17
18 Under this procedure the time horizon of the scenario exercise (say 2005 to 2100) would be
19 divided into smaller intervals (e.g. 2005 to 2020, 2020 to 2050, and 2050 to 2100). Rather
20 than specifying driving forces over the entire time horizon as is usually done, the driving
21 forces would be specified only for the first time interval. The next step would be to evaluate
22 the consequences of these driving forces on land use/cover for the first time interval (either
23 with a model or with storylines). The results of the first interval would then be used to set the
24 starting conditions for the second interval. For example, if agricultural land in a study region
25 is depleted by the end of the first scenario interval, this information could be used to assume a
26 higher rate of migration from rural to urban areas in the second interval. In effect, the scenario
27 developers would “interact” with the scenario itself, and would specify the feedback from
28 land use to driving forces Rather than being specified only one time at the beginning of the
29 scenarios, the driving forces would “interact” and be modified by the dynamics of the
30 scenario.

31
32 A disadvantage of this method is the large effort it requires. We also note that the idea of
33 interactive scenario development resembles the procedures of strategic gaming and “policy
34 exercises” applied earlier to environmental and other problems (Checkland, 1981; Fishwick
35 and Luker, 1991; Toth, 1988 and 1995).

36 37 5. Broaden the Realm of Application of Global Scenarios

38
39 An obvious way to increase the *relevance* of scenarios is to develop them for addressing a
40 wider range of scientific and policy questions. Most existing global land scenarios were
41 developed for analyzing climate change issues such as the emissions of land-related
42 greenhouse gases or the flux of carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and biosphere. As a
43 result they have a bias towards processes important to climate change and this limits their
44 relevance to other issues. Global scenarios could also be developed for analyzing other
45 important issues such as the consequences of trade liberalization, or the planning of “nature
46 corridors” for increasing the connectivity of protected areas. Land scenarios could also
47 contribute to strategies for achieving the land-related Millennium Development Goals (such
48 as the goal to reduce world hunger) and for analyzing the implementation of the terrestrial
49 aspects of the Convention on Biodiversity (see, e.g., Leemans, 1999). These applications will
50 require an extension of the driving forces and processes covered by the scenarios.

6. Develop Multi-Scale Scenarios

In this paragraph we recommend developing multi-scale scenarios as a way of enhancing the *credibility* and *relevance* of scenarios in general. We noted earlier that existing global and regional scenarios tend to provide different kinds of information. Global scenarios provide a comprehensive picture of the implications of large-scale driving forces on land use and cover change, while regional scenarios provide a more detailed representation of land use/cover changes which can be related more realistically to biogeochemical processes such as soil degradation, changes in hydrology and land processes leading to emissions of greenhouse gases. Both types of scenarios lack a measure of *credibility* and *relevance* because they cannot capture the view of the others, and would gain *credibility* and *relevance* if they could be linked.

In the text we referred to various efforts at developing multi-scale scenarios. A possible linkage would be to use global scenarios for setting boundary conditions and constraints for regional scenarios, e.g. the demands of global food markets or the implementation of national/international nature conservation goals. In the other direction, regional scenarios covering different parts of the world could provide input that is difficult to capture at the global scale. Some examples are the impact of land-related institutions (farming associations or regional planning organizations) on land use change, visions of regional development pathways, the influence of cultural background on land use practices, and attitudes towards nature protection.

7. Improve the Representation of Socio-Economic Behavior in Scenarios

Here we recommend increasing the *credibility* and *creativity* of scenarios by improving the representation of socio-economic behavior in scenarios, especially by applying agent-based modeling. Agent-based models have been used for simulations at the local and regional scale and have a high potential for use in the development of land scenarios at all scales (see Chapter 7). They provide a method to improve and formalize (in the sense of making more transparent and traceable) important social processes in scenarios, and thereby will increase the *credibility* of scenarios. For example, agent-based models can provide insight into interactions between actors relevant to land use change such as between farming groups and the local government. Such approaches may also allow scenarios to incorporate the types of feedback processes that are currently poorly represented (as discussed above). This includes, in particular, processes that relate to policy-making and institutional responses to emerging environmental problems. By providing a platform for representing different ideas policy responses, agent-based modeling can also help produce more *creative* scenarios. But much work has to be done to enable the use of agent-based modeling or its results on the global level.

8.7 Closing Remarks

Summing up, although we are only in the early stages of analyzing the future state of land use and land cover on earth, we have already learned much from existing scenarios. One clear message of the scenarios of particular importance to global change is that current land use/cover patterns are not static. Indeed major changes in the earth's land cover over the next several decades, including trend reversals, are not implausible. The fact that some scenarios only begin to show distinctive trends after two or three decades also implies that a long term view is needed to better anticipate the future of land.

1 Although we have not evaluated the impacts of potential changes in land use and cover, we
2 believe that the scale of changes shown in the scenarios could have large implications on the
3 earth system. For that reason alone we should devote greater effort to understanding the future
4 of land.

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7
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- 1 Abbreviated figure captions (full captions with figures)
- 2
- 3 Figure 8-1 Global scenarios of agricultural land from 1995 to 2100.
- 4 Figure 8-2 Global scenarios of forest land from 1995 to 2100.
- 5 Figure 8-3 Global scenarios of urban land from 1995 to 2050.
- 6 Figure 8-4 Drivers of global scenarios of land use and cover from 1995 to 2050.
- 7 Figure 8-5 Scenarios of agricultural land in Africa from 1995 to 2100.
- 8 Figure 8-6 Scenarios of forest land in Africa from 1995 to 2100.
- 9 Figure 8-7 Drivers of scenarios of land use and cover in Africa from 1995 to 2050
- 10 Figure 8-8 Scenarios of agricultural land in Europe from 1995 to 2100.
- 11 Figure 8-9 Scenarios of forest land in Europe from 1995 to 2100.
- 12 Figure 8-10 Drivers of scenarios of land use and cover in Europe from 1995 to 2050.
- 13 Figure 8-11 Multi-scale designs of two “sub-global” assessments of the MA

Figures:




Figure 8-1. Global scenarios of agricultural land from 1995 to 2100. Sources: Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4: IPCC-SRES scenarios "A1", "A2", "B1", "B2" (IPCC, 2000) computed with IMAGE model (IMAGE-Team, 2001). Scenarios 5, 6, 7, 8: Scenarios of Global Scenario Group "Market Forces", "Policy Reform", "Fortress World", "Great Transition" computed by PoleStar model (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Scenarios 9, 10: "GEO-3" scenarios (UNEP, 2004) "Markets First", "Policy First" computed with PoleStar model. "Agricultural land" comprises the land cover classes "Agricultural Land" and "Extensive Grassland" within the IPCC-SRES scenarios computed by the IMAGE model, and is the sum of "Cropland" and "Grazing Land" in the remaining scenarios.

Figure 8-2. Global scenarios of forest land from 1995 to 2100. The key to scenario numbers is the same as in Figure 1. "Forest land" is defined as the sum of "Carbon Plantations", "Regrowth Forest" "Boreal Forest", "Cool Conifer Forest", "Temperate Mixed Forest", "Temperate Deciduous Forest" "Warm Mixed Forest", and "Tropical Forest" within the SRES scenarios computed by the IMAGE model. For the remaining scenarios forest land is the sum of "Natural Forest" and "Plantation".




Figure 8-3. Global scenarios of urban land from 1995 to 2050. Sources: Scenarios 5, 6, 7, 8: Scenarios of Global Scenario Group "Market Forces", "Policy Reform", "Fortress World", "Great Transition" computed by PoleStar model (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Scenarios 9, 10: "GEO-3" scenarios (UNEP, 2004) "Markets First", "Policy First" computed with PoleStar model.

Figure 8-4. Drivers of global scenarios of land use and cover from 1995 to 2050.




Figure 8-5. Scenarios of agricultural land in Africa from 1995 to 2100.

Sources: Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4: IPCC-SRES scenarios "A1", "A2", "B1", "B2" (IPCC, 2000) computed with IMAGE model (IMAGE-Team, 2001). Scenarios 5, 6, 7, 8: Scenarios of Global Scenario Group "Market Forces", "Policy Reform", "Fortress World", "Great Transition" computed by PoleStar model (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Scenarios 9, 10, 11, 12: "GEO-3" scenarios (UNEP, 2004) "Markets First", "Policy First", "Security First", and "Sustainability First" computed with PoleStar model. Scenario 13 refers to the "Reference Scenario" of the OECD "Environmental Outlook" study computed by PoleStar model (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Scenario 14 addresses the "Reference Scenario" of the FAO "Agriculture towards 2015/30" study. "Agricultural land" is defined as in Figure 1.




Figure 8-6. Scenarios of forest land in Africa from 1995 to 2100.

The key to scenario numbers is the same as in Figure 5, except the scenarios 13, and 14 which do not contain forest land cover. "Forest land" is defined as in Figure 2.




Figure 8-7. Drivers of scenarios of land use and cover in Africa from 1995 to 2050.




Figure 8-8. Scenarios of agricultural land in Europe from 1995 to 2100. Sources: Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4: IPCC-SRES scenarios "A1", "A2", "B1", "B2" (IPCC, 2000) computed with IMAGE model (IMAGE-Team, 2001). Scenarios 5, 6, 7, 8: Scenarios of Global Scenario Group "Market Forces", "Policy Reform", "Fortress World", "Great Transition" computed by PoleStar model (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Scenarios 9, 10, 11, 12: "GEO-3" scenarios (UNEP, 2004) "Markets First", "Policy First", "Security First", and "Sustainability First" computed with PoleStar model. Scenario 13 addresses the OECD Environmental Outlook "Reference Scenario" computed by PoleStar model (Kemp-Benedict et al., 2002). Scenarios 14, 15, 16, 17: WRR scenarios "Nature and Landscape", "Regional Development", "Free Markets and Free Trade", and Environmental Protection".




Figure 8-9. Scenarios of forest land in Europe from 1995 to 2100.

The key to scenario numbers is the same as in Figure 8, except the scenarios 13 to 17 which do not contain forest land cover. "Forest land" is defined as in Figure 2.

Figure 8-10. Drivers of scenarios of land use and cover in Europe from 1995 to 2050.

Figure 8-11 Multi-scale designs of two “sub-global” assessments of the MA. SafMA = Southern Africa Millennium Assessment, SADC = Southern Africa Development Community.